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ABSTRACT
I defend resentment as a legitimate and necessary moral attitude by neutralizing an objection 
that points to its hostile and morally repugnant character. The argument proceeds by em-
bedding resentment in a view of morality as a social and communicative practice, supported 
by a common knowledge of apparently inborn moral expectations. In virtue of these natural 
expectations, every person is pre-institutionally entitled to goodwill and to the pleasure that 
arises from showing and receiving goodwill from others. Resentment arises naturally when 
these expectations are violated: it is a reaction to an offence, leading to a dynamic exchange 
that aims to restore a broken moral relationship between persons. The offender participates 
in this communicative exchange by undergoing a form of punishment that is self-imposed 
and expressed through feelings of guilt and contrition.
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Introduction: Reactive attitudes  
and moral reparation
Compatibilism is the view that an agent can act freely and be held responsible even if her 
actions are determined by natural (including psychological) causes. One difficulty with this view 
is that the social practice of blaming and holding responsible requires that the agent could have 
done otherwise; but natural causation seems to preclude this. A standard compatibilist response 
is that the agent could have done otherwise if she had considered other reasons; and she can be 
blamed for not considering them. Against the obvious regress in the argument (e.g., determin-
ism precludes that the agent could have considered those other reasons), the compatibilist must 
quickly remark that blaming and holding responsible ultimately function as ways of influencing 
the character of the blamed person, such that in similar circumstances in the future the agent 
will act differently (Nowell-Smith, 1948; Smart, 1961). The practices of moral evaluation, of 
holding someone responsible, of blaming and even punishing make sense because they instantiate 
forward-looking social-psychological processes, which ultimately operate to adjust characters to 
moral expectations. 
Strawson (2008 [1974]) offers a broadly phenomenological argument to the effect that 
the future-oriented tenor of these practices, as interpreted in classical compatibilism, distorts 
morality if it is not complemented by the backward-looking dimension of reactive and self-re-
active attitudes. He presents the argument as part of a refurbished compatibilist alternative. 
Before Strawson’s paper, compatibilism reduced blaming and holding responsible to impersonal 
practices aiming at social control in a purely forward-looking way, without the reactive attitudes 
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(Nowell-Smith, 1948; Smart, 1961). The function of such 
practices was to deter future wrongdoing and to promote the 
general welfare of society. Thoughts of desert as a justifica-
tion of punishment were to be eradicated, and not only from 
folk-views regarding responsibility and blame; they should 
also disappear from our legal practices, which should be sole-
ly organized around deterrence (Greene and Cohen, 2004). 
Strawson was not happy with this view. He observed that it 
completely ignored vital psychological dimensions of doing 
and suffering wrong. I believe that he was right, for some-
thing crucial about morality falls out of the consequentialist 
forward-looking reading. Strawson located the missing ele-
ments in the backward-looking feature of reactive and self-re-
active attitudes like resentment, indignation, gratitude, guilt, 
and remorse. In the following, I argue that the importance of 
reactive and self-reactive attitudes is that they combine both 
the backward and the forward-looking dimensions of moral 
practice in a communicative dynamics that is lost in the nar-
row consequentialist attitude.
Strawson was not invoking the common retributivist 
view. In fact, a common brand of retributivism serves as an 
ally to the narrow consequentialism that Strawson was crit-
icising. The alliance between retributivism and consequen-
tialism (Goodenough, 2004) focuses restrictively on violent 
punishments, namely inflicting one of the following on of-
fenders: physical pain and/or loss of property, limb, freedom, 
or life. The difference between them is that retributivism 
inflexibly prescribes such punishments, while consequential-
ism is tempted to withdraw them if they do not guarantee 
deterrence. But these punishments severely narrow the idea 
of moral reparation (Bennett, 2002; Holroyd, 2010). Violent 
punishment, though it may give some satisfaction to victims, 
does not really repair or restore anything. I want to distin-
guish it categorically from a different kind of punishment 
that could be labeled restorative, in reference to the concept 
of restorative justice ( Johnston, 1999). But I am not fixed 
on this label. Perhaps a neutral anthropological one, like ‘an-
cestral’ punishment, would be better. One example of this 
type of punishment is a group-level withdrawal of goodwill 
directed at the offender. This phenomenon is known in an-
thropology as ostracism. It is the preferred form of punish-
ment among hunters and gatherers and similar egalitarian 
societies (Boehm, 1999). It is severe, because it confronts the 
offender with the loss of every form of communication and 
hence of the cooperative relationships previously entertained 
with members of her group. Another example is the self-im-
posed punishment usually expressed in feelings of guilt and 
contrition. These two kinds of punishment must have been 
common among our ancestors (Trivers, 1971). In contrast, 
evidence suggests that violent punishment, typical of retrib-
utivism and consequentialism, is virtually inexistent among 
hunters and gatherers (Boehm, 1999). 
In this paper I am solely concerned with self-imposed 
punishment expressed in feelings of guilt and contrition. Its 
importance lies in the fact that it combines the backward- 
and forward-looking dimensions: it looks back at the wrong 
done and acknowledges it, but it also looks forward to the 
restoration of the moral link with the victim, only possible in 
virtue of its backward-looking feature. Linking resentment 
and other hostile reactive attitudes to this self-imposed pun-
ishment, whereby the offender restores the moral link to the 
victim and the community, provides a reply to the moral crit-
icisms leveled against the “hostility” of such reactive attitudes 
(Pereboom, 2008; Kelly, 2008; Nussbaum, 2015). The clue 
lies in interpreting resentment as including a demand direct-
ed at the offender to undergo the self-imposed pain that arises 
from acknowledging one’s wrong actions. It is part of a com-
municative exchange between victim and offender (Nozick, 
1981; Bennett, 2002; McGeer, 2012). Reactive and self-reac-
tive attitudes are usually the vehicles of this exchange: resent-
ment in the offended party, followed by guilt and contrition in 
the offender. I should here insert a caveat: I use “resentment” 
to refer to feelings like indignation and moral anger, which I 
believe was Strawson’s meaning. I do not use it to refer to the 
slow-burning emotion that perhaps would be more properly 
captured with terms like “rancour” and “grudge”.
Typical of the narrow consequentialist understanding of 
freedom and responsibility is the view that the kind of moral 
reparation that happens in a communicative-emotional ex-
change between victim and offender is a pure delusion, because 
once a wrong is done, it cannot be undone. But discarding this 
exchange amounts to shedding reactive and self-reactive at-
titudeswhich are its vehicles. Strawson believes that this is 
equivalent to dumping morality altogether. It would reduce 
morality to deterrence, while reducing deterrence, in turn, to 
violent punishment, i.e., the infliction of externally imposed 
pain or some kind of material loss on the offender. Mor-
al motives would thus be reduced to a selfish deliberation or 
calculation, by means of which would-be offenders weigh the 
probability of a rather heavy loss as a consequence of their mis-
deeds, against the selfish benefits intended through those very 
misdeeds. Without moral reparation, moral demands are noth-
ing but the manipulation of others through threats (and some-
times incentives), whereby addressees only need the capacity 
to reason in an egoistic way. No role is left for the communica-
tive process of moral reparation that begins with resentment 
in the offended party, followed by the offender’s acknowledg-
ment to having done wrong. It seems that a consequentialist 
view of punishment (and its common retributivist ally) “treats 
everyone as outside the moral community”, as Nozick once said 
(Nozick, 1981, p. 372).
A psychological ritual of restoration is built into our 
reactivity and self-reactivity to moral wrongdoing (Walk-
er, 2006). In moral reparation, the parties undergo a ritual, 
as it were, through reactive and self-reactive attitudes: they 
look back at the wrong done and aim forward at restoring 
the moral link broken by the offence. Resentment proclaims 
that a wrong has been committed. The offender may respond 
in sympathy, by sharing the evaluative perspective of the of-
fended party, who condemns the action. In the self-reactive 
attitude known as contrition, the offender feels pain at having 
wronged the offended party. The pain should be felt on ac-
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count of the wrong done, not just in the form of a ‘contagion’ 
that comes from observing the victim’s pain. Strawson does 
not go into such detail, but he does mention the complemen-
tarity between reactive and self-reactive attitudes: the readi-
ness of the offended party to punish corresponds to a read-
iness in the offender to accept punishment (Strawson, 2008 
[1974], p. 23-24). In what follows, I shall explain resentment’s 
role in moral repair. What needs repair is a state of mutual 
goodwill: a communicative and public intersubjective state 
that serves as the foundation of morality, akin to mutual sym-
pathy in Smith’s A Theory of Moral Sentiments.
The origin of resentment  
in three steps
Strawson mentions that reactive attitudes arise from 
mutual expectations of goodwill (Strawson, 2008 [1974], 
p. 5). Reactive attitudes are part of our nature, and the same 
applies to the mutual expectations of goodwill that support 
them. These natural attitudes and expectations justify pre-in-
stitutional attributions of entitlements and desert (Scanlon, 
2013). I therefore interpret these expectations as containing 
a foundational moral principle, which gives resentment and 
other reactive attitudes their moral content. I cannot say 
whether Strawson would have agreed to this interpretation 
or not, but I will let it stand, because it allows me to build 
a bridge to Adam Smith’s theory of morality based on sym-
pathy; a natural ally, I believe, of Strawson’s views. We can 
explain resentmentand in a sense justify itby telling a 
plausible story about how it arises from mutual expectations 
of goodwill. We are apparently born with these expectations, 
for infants also seem to have them, as shown by empirical re-
search (Bloom, 2013; Baillargeon et al., 2015). The story de-
velops in three steps. (i) The first thing is to realize that expec-
tations of goodwill, insofar as they are both shared and public, 
involve higher-order intentionality and are, therefore, com-
municative. (ii) They communicate a basic normative stance, 
namely, that everyone participating in this shared space is 
entitled to goodwill and to the pleasure arising from showing 
and receiving goodwill. (iii) A violation of these expectations 
for selfish reasons denies moral status to the victim; it causes 
resentment, which is a combination of pain, disapproval, and 
a demand to re-establish mutual goodwill.
The three steps unpacked
Communication of mutual expectations
Expectations of goodwill are mutual and also shared. 
The concept of shared expectations is similar to the concept 
of shared intentions (Tomasello, 2009). It implies common 
knowledge and higher-order intentionality, i.e., agents have 
common knowledge about the fact that they have such ex-
pectations with regard to one another. This would usually 
be expressed by saying that agents know that they know that 
they know (recursively) that they have these expectations 
with regard to one another. I do not believe that common 
knowledge requires an infinite recursion of higher-order in-
tentional states, but the point is unsubstantial here. In any 
case, common knowledge gives mutual expectations the qual-
ity of being communicative, or rather, of being the basis for a 
communicative dynamics, because common knowledge plac-
es the content of the expectation in a shared, public domain, 
as if it had been publicly proclaimed. Common knowledge of 
mutual expectations of goodwill is constitutive of the public 
sphere and of the entitlement to goodwill of anyone who par-
ticipates in this public sphere.
The basic norm: Everyone  
is entitled to goodwill 
What is the content of the communication embedded 
in mutual expectations of goodwill? It will help to compare 
goodwill to sympathy in Adam Smith’s moral theory. In 
Smith, sympathy has both cognitive and evaluative compo-
nents. I use it here to refer primarily to the evaluative ele-
ment. Through sympathy we confer value on the wellbeing of 
others, similar to the value that each claims, at least implicitly, 
for her own person. This statement describes what sympa-
thy does to our motivational system. But once we acquire 
this motive, and in virtue of common knowledge, we enter 
a public sphere in which agents expect mutual respect from 
all participants. The propositional content communicated is a 
generalized demand for mutual goodwill and its correspond-
ing generalized endorsement. When we confer, in sympathy, 
value on the wellbeing of others, we acknowledge the enti-
tlement we both have to equal consideration. We give each 
other this entitlement naturally, precisely in mutual goodwill 
or mutual sympathy. We can withdraw it, normally in reac-
tion to an offence, for an offence implicitly declares a prior 
withdrawal of sympathy by the offender. We give each other 
mutual sympathy by nature, I assume with Smith, perhaps 
through an adaptive social instinct mediated by memory and 
self-awareness (Darwin, 1981 [1871], Chapter 3).
The comparison with sympathy suggests that feelings of 
a special kind are at the very root of morality. As Smith ex-
plains, pleasure arises from sympathy and mutual sympathy. 
Pleasure may be correlated with future benefit, but it does not 
arise instrumentally at the thought of future benefit; it aris-
es immediately when experiencing mutual sympathy (Smith, 
1982, TMS, I.i.1.1; I.i.2.1; I.i.2.2; I.ii.4.1; III.2.6). When we are 
targets of sympathy, we feeland think of ourselves asap-
proved of and loved. Mutual goodwill, like mutual sympathy, 
is the reciprocal giving of approval and love.
A strong objection against this view immediately comes 
to mind. It is common knowledge that humans can hardly 
be said to love strangers, solely on account of their being hu-
man. The sympathy we bring towards strangers is meager and 
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the quality of being human deserves either love or hatred de-
pending on what other qualities a person displays. There is 
no love of mankind as such, Hume said (Hume, 1978 THN, 
481). But Hume also said that if a European encountered a 
Chinese person on the moon, they would feel a sparkle of mu-
tual love, just on account of both being human (Hume, 1978, 
THN, 482). So perhaps there is a love of humankind after all.
In fact, the love in question is not directed at humankind 
as such. It is a type of love that we normally give to strang-
ers, provided they are entitled beings, beings with whom we 
can sympathize (whether human, intelligent or sentient) and 
that respond, in some degree, to our sympathy. This type of 
love explains the nature of justice. Justice is the minimum of 
mutual goodwill that we naturally give entitled beings. Even 
when we pay our taxes for the sole reason that it is just to 
do so, we are expressing our goodwill towards the collective 
that will benefit from the public goods that tax revenues help 
produce. The minimum of goodwill involves the duty not to 
harm others, i.e., to respect their life, their property, reputa-
tion, and agreements reached with them, unless they them-
selves show ill will first. It does not include the virtue of be-
nevolence, or the duty to help, and for this reason we may fail 
to realize that a kind of love is required to see others as being 
entitled to the minimum amount of goodwill, namely justice.
Resentment demands the restoration of 
mutual goodwill
Violating expectations of goodwill means failing to dis-
play the minimum level, which is justice. Unjust acts, name-
ly those that attack, for selfish reasons, the life, property, or 
reputation of another person clearly violate expectations of 
goodwill (even infants have moral expectations, see section 
“The origin of resentment in three steps”). They treat their 
target as if she has no moral status and no claim to goodwill. 
But since, per hypothesis, selfishness motivates this treat-
ment, either the offender publicly denies any moral com-
mitments, which would attract a severe form of group-pun-
ishment, e.g. ostracism, or she violates this expectation only 
towards a specific target and hopes her authorship will re-
main unknown. But even if only the target is aware of the 
act’s authorship, the publicity condition holds, because the 
wrong thus enters the public domain that both target and 
offender occupy. The target can respond in several ways, but 
she basically demands re-establishment of goodwill from 
the offender. Resentment communicates this demand, but 
it also comprises a feeling of pain: being denied sympathy 
for selfish reasons causes pain in the target, just as receiving 
sympathy is accompanied by pleasure in both the subject 
and the target of sympathy. 
This concludes my attempt to explain how resentment, 
in both its communicative and emotional aspects, arises from 
expectations of goodwill. This view of its origins will obvious-
ly tell us something about its nature, described in the follow-
ing two sections.
The nature of resentment
Resentment is a part of the communicative interaction 
in which we are spontaneously engaged (Nozick, 1981; Ben-
nett, 2002; McGeer, 2012, 2013) by virtue of shared and mu-
tual expectations of goodwill. I remind the reader that I use “re-
sentment” to refer to the moral indignation felt by the target of 
injustice immediately after suffering an offence. As such, it has 
propositional content. On one level, the recipient of an offence 
morally condemns the action. This moral condemnation is jus-
tified because we spontaneously demand and expect mutual 
goodwill from all those who we can assume to share this expecta-
tion and have common knowledge of the sharing. Shared expec-
tations generate a shared norm about everyone’s entitlement to 
goodwill. When somebody violates this norm, resentment arises. 
The victim disapproves of the offender and her action, publicly 
accuses her of violating the basic moral norm (whereby common 
knowledge in both the offender and the victim suffices for pub-
licity), and finally demands repair and restoration. Disapproval, 
public accusation, and demand for repair are three connected 
propositional attitudes that resentment implicitly expresses.
Resentment would be pointless if it never achieved the 
goal of restoring the intersubjective state of mutual goodwill. 
The point of resentment is to elicit in the offender a receptive 
attitude to its demands. If the offender responds positively, 
she generates agreement with the evaluative perspective of 
the victim. Through contrition and guilt, the offender shares 
the evaluative perspective of the victim, approves her indig-
nation, and feels pain on account of the pain inflicted on her. 
Contrition also entails a self-evaluation: harming the victim 
was wrong. In resentment, we want the offender to under-
go this response, enact these feelings, and make these evalu-
ations. In going through this process, offenders show sympa-
thypost hoctowards their victims; and in this way they 
contribute to restoring the state of mutual goodwill that was 
denied through the offence. 
A desire for the offender to suffer
When offenders respond through contrition and feelings 
of guilt, they feel pain. These feelings and this pain are good 
news for the victim, who desires that the offender undergo 
them. But, can it be moral to want someone else to suffer? 
(Nozick, 1981, p. 363ff; Mackie, 1985, p. 206ff.) Maybe it can, if 
the suffering that one desires for another consists in the painful 
feelings they must undergo to repair the broken moral link (see 
Bennett, 2002, p. 151-153; Holroyd, 2010). In the context of 
mutual sympathy, which is by nature communicative, pain is a 
necessary part of the communicative dynamics that begin with 
an offence. An offence causes pain to the victim, expressed in 
resentment. If the offender shows contrition, she takes on some 
pain in response to the pain she inflicted. All this must be pub-
lic, in the sense that both agent and patient, at least, should have 
common knowledge of this dynamic. Here is a type of pain that 
the victim can morally desire that the offender undergo, for 
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this suffering is a necessary element in the process that restores 
a broken moral link. This clarification answers the objection 
pointing to the immorality of resentment. 
There is one last issue on which I wish to comment. 
Couldn’t we achieve the same goal of reparation by substitut-
ing resentment with dispassionate messages or reminders, as 
in “detached blaming” (Pickard, 2013)? This kind of blaming 
also demands goodwill, but omits the reactive feeling of re-
sentment. This sounds plausible. I believe, however, that the 
desirability of “detached blaming” appeals mainly to those for 
whom the “strains of involvement” (Strawson, 2008 [1974], 
p. 10) weigh heavy, so that they seek refuge in a procedure 
that can be followed without feelings. For them, moral inter-
ventions like blaming and punishing are a duty, with no feel-
ings attached. There is also the peril of relapsing into purely 
forward-looking consequentialism. I would therefore favor a 
slightly different interpretation of “detachment”: it should not 
imply a total lack of feeling, but rather self-command over 
“unsocial” emotions (Smith, 1982, TMS, I. ii. 3), such as the 
exaggerations of resentment or anger that would lead to re-
venge and to inflicting violent punishment on the offender. 
A total lack of feeling towards offenders would probably lack 
effectiveness in morally shaping the emotions and characters 
of those who need some adjustment to meet moral expec-
tations. Moreover, if blaming should be purged of reactive 
feelings, should we not say the same of contrition? But try to 
picture a detached version of contrition: what would contri-
tion be without psychological self-reactive pain? Anyhow, the 
purpose of this paper is not to discuss the moral appropriate-
ness of these detached alternatives. My purpose was merely 
to vindicate resentment as a morally legitimate feeling.
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